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The Distribution of Decision-Making. The Case of a Flexible 
Public Transport System 
Abstract 
Instead of explaining the outcomes of a policy process with reference to a rational planning logic, this 
paper scrutinises the circumstances in which decisions actually are taken. It follows issues when they 
displace between different decision-making settings. The approach is applied to a case of decision-
making about a flexible public transport system in and around Hoogeveen, the Netherlands: a case in 
which the decision-making process was distributed over no less than fifteen settings. The main result 
of the analysis is a typology of five different displacements based on typical framing effects, which 
could form the basis of a theory with which complex, interactive and opportunistic decision-making 
processes can be understood in more general terms.  
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Introduction 
There is not much realism in the view that a new and innovative public transport service is rationally 
designed and straightforwardly implemented.  The rational policy planning model assumes a linear 
sequence  of  steps,  from  defining  the  objectives,  to  constructing  a  causal  model,  to  applying 
instruments, to defining targets, and to implementing policy. By implication, it assumes one central 
actor who controls this process (Birkland, 2001; Hoogerwerf & Herweijer, 2003). This is an ideal and 
a reduction. There is rarely one central actor in charge of a planning process. Action in general, and 
innovative activities in particular, take place in complex networks of stakeholders and is much better 
characterised as an iterative, interactive and incremental process (Linblom, 1959; Nelson & Winter, 
1977;  Smits,  2002).  Actors  behave  boundedly  rational  at  best,  meaning  that  there  is  always  an 2 
important element of opportunism in decision-making and policy planning (Simon, 1955). Clearly, 
this constrains the possibility to derive generally applicable lessons from studying particular cases of 
decision-making.  
This article argues why it is important to focus on settings as the local circumstances for decision-
making.  It  proposes  and  applies  a  conceptual  framework  for  understanding  the  interactions  and 
contingencies in decision-making given the opportunities that the actual settings offer. The claim is 
that, despite its complexity and despite opportunism, the decision-making process is still patterned in a 
certain  way.  Because  the  bounds  of  rationality  coincide  with  the  bounds  of  settings,  one  can 
understand the decision-making process by studying the characteristics of settings where issues are 
dealt with.  
The conceptual framework developed for this approach is presented in the next section after the core 
concepts  of  ‘issues’,  ‘settings’,  ‘framing’  and  ‘displacements’  are  introduced.  The  framework  is 
subsequently applied to the case of decision-making about a flexible public transport system in and 
around Hoogeveen, the Netherlands: a case in which the decision-making process was distributed over 
no  less  than  fifteen  settings,  partly  because  of  a  national  policy  shift  towards  liberalisation  and 
decentralisation. Three major issues are followed to show how displacements between these settings 
led to a certain reframing of issues and to their final outcome. The main result of the analysis is a 
typology of five different displacements based on typical framing effects. In addition, an attempt is 
made to explain why issues displace according to these five types. The main claim of this study is that 
if these results can be confirmed by other studies, then a theory of displacements might be offered with 
which complex, interactive and opportunistic decision-making processes can be understood in more 
general terms. The article ends with the suggestion that the typology can also be a very helpful aid for 
evaluating the (democratic) quality of the process. 
Issues: action and anti-programs 
In  this  case  study,  ‘issues’  are  followed  when  they  displace  between  settings.  Especially  in 
controversial cases that justify a conflict-model, issues are the central element of the decision-making 
process. Issues consist of opposed opinions, interests or visions; they are not settled until one of the 3 
contesting  parties  succeeds  to  recruit  sufficient  support  from  allies  and  bystanders  and  forces 
opponents to capitulate for whatever reason (Lukes, 1974; Schattschneider, 1960). 
In a similar vein, but with regard to innovation processes, Latour has coined the notions of action 
programs and antiprograms to describe decision-making processes (Latour, 1991). An action program 
is a vision of the future in which discoveries and inventions are transformed into a working artefact 
that  is  developed,  used  and  maintained  by  a  diversity  of  actors.  Action  programs  also  include 
supportive elements, such as funding, legislation and public support. The expression and promotion of 
an action programs always implies a certain distribution of roles and responsibilities among actors and 
for this reason action programs are hardly ever without contestation.  
Antiprograms  are  action  programs  of  others,  which  run  counter  to  the  original  action  program. 
Opponents may engage in antiprograms that aim at objection, rejection or adjustment of the action 
programs they are confronted with. The clash between an action program and an anti-program defines 
an issue in what can be called the politics of innovation. 
Settings as a theatre stage 
Issues are not free-floating entities, but are articulated, discussed and settled in ‘settings’. Settings are 
the  direct  contexts  of  the  clashes  between  action  and  antiprograms.  Examples  of  settings  are 
negotiation structures, sites for demonstration of innovative technology, forums for debate, political 
institutions, and protest actions. Settings are not neutral. Some actors have better access than others; 
some issues enter the agenda more easily than others. In this sense, settings are biased and politically 
loaded, because they impose constrains on the process (Schattschneider, 1960). Bias, however, also 
has a positive meaning: settings not only constrain, but also enable more or less effective participation 
in the decision-making process (Gomart & Hajer, 2003).  
To conceptualise these constraining and enabling qualities of settings I use the dramaturgical metaphor 
of the stage where an act is performed. This metaphor emphasises three dimensions on which settings 
are characterized. First, the access conditions refer to the reasons why settings allow some actors to 
participate while others are part of the audience or excluded altogether. Access conditions define who 4 
is allowed to enter a particular setting in order to find support (among participants and attributes) for 
his action program.  
The second dimension is attributes. Settings provide the attributes with which the performance is 
enacted. Attributes are those supports that are valid in a particular kind of setting. Attributes may 
strengthen one action program or link different action programs together; in both cases they shift the 
balance of power.  
The  third  dimension  is  audience.  The  audience  of  a  setting  comprises  those  who  are  indirectly 
involved, either by asserting influence on the participants in the setting or by asserting influence in 
subsequent settings. An example of the first is the general public whose opinion and judgment do the 
participants anticipate. An example of concrete influence in subsequent settings is the electorate, who 
pass judgment about politicians by voting when the issue displaces to polling stations. 
These three characteristics of settings make up the (negative or positive) bias of settings. Due to their 
biases, settings frame a ‘performance’: they co-determine which issues are central or peripheral and 
which aspects of issues are relevant in a particular setting; issues might even appear or disappear due 
to the bias of a setting. The framing of issues is thus the direct effect of their appearance in settings 
(note the related meanings of the verbs ‘to set’ and ‘to frame’).  
Displacements between settings 
Because of the different framings of settings, displacements of issues between settings highly matter in 
the politics of innovation. A ‘displacement’ is defined as the movement of an issue to another setting 
or as a significant change on one of the three dimensions of the setting. Displacements come about 
because the decision-making context often still needs to be built; developing procedures and structures 
is  a  process  of  continuous  exploration  and  learning  itself.  Actors  deliberate  in  settings,  but 
simultaneously  about  settings.  They  search  for  appropriate  forms  and  devise  the  conditions  for 
deliberation. But how do they succeed in such endeavours?  
The underlying dynamics of displacements can be divided in a ‘how’ question and a ‘why’ question. 
The how question concerns the routes of displacements in terms of the settings involved. Reframing is 
an effect of routes of displacements, because this depends on the relative differences between the 5 
characteristics  of  settings.  Therefore,  one  question  is  whether  the  different  reframing  effects  are 
patterned by routes of displacements.  
The why question concerns the conditions and driving forces of displacements. These can be divided 
in internal and external conditions. An internal condition is, for example, the ‘mobilization of bias’ 
(Schattschneider, 1960): actors purposefully try to displace the issue to settings that are biased in 
favour of their action program. External conditions of displacement include institutional arrangements 
or contingent events. Institutional arrangements are procedures for decision-making that are part of 
more general policies or polities. Contingent events may also lead to displacements. For example, in 
debates about the introduction of chip technology in the Dutch public transport system arguments 
about tariff differentiation have suddenly become much less relevant than arguments related to social 
safety since 9/11 and the Madrid railway bombs. 
Figure  1  schematically  presents  the  conceptual  framework  and  illustrate  the  central  role  of 
displacements therein.  
 
<<Figure 1. The conceptual framework>> 
The case of a flexible public transport system 
For the understanding of displacements, we use the metaphor of settings as a theatre stage, which 
comprises the characterization of settings in terms of access conditions, attributes, and audiences. 
Displacements are then conceived of as mutations of the access conditions, of the availability and 
allowance  of  attributes  and  of  the  presence,  composition  and  role  of  the  audience.  This 
characterization  expresses  in  detail  what  displacement  entails  and  why  this  leads  to  a  certain 
reframing. The following empirical questions are therefore addressed in a case study: (i) how do the 
characteristics of settings influence the (re)framing of issues? (ii) Is it possible to characterize different 
types of displacements based on reframing effects? And (iii) what are the main conditions for these 
displacements to take place?  6 
The case comprises the introduction between 1999 and 2004 of a flexible and user driven public 
transport concept in and between Hoogeveen and Meppel, two small towns in the province of Drenthe 
in the northern part of the Netherlands. Decision-making took place in a large variety of settings. For 
example, major decision were taken in Provincial States; a Development Group supervised the project; 
a panel of users was supposed to decide about operational issues; on the work floor two strikes took 
place; separate bilateral meetings were organized to settle conflicts; and one of those conflicts ended 
in court. This variety of settings results in an interesting case for the exploration of the metaphor of a 
setting as a theatre stage and the specific role of settings in the dynamics of displacements.  
To identify the relevant settings, a statement that expresses an interesting action program is taken as 
the starting point. Next, this action program is confronted with statements that express antiprograms. 
This confrontation always happens in a particular setting, the conditions of which can be subsequently 
scrutinized: an interrogation of the settings based on the theatre metaphor is done to explain why these 
action and antiprograms are stated as they are.
1  
The data used for this case study are derived from archival records, policy documents, evaluation 
reports, and, most importantly, minutes of meetings. Archives of newspaper articles were effective 
starting  points,  because  popular  media  spend  a  lot  of  attention  to  innovative  activity  in  public 
transport. By means of a snowball method (Bijker, 1995) references to meetings, policy documents, 
project proposals, and other sources of information are found. For scrutiny of settings this study makes 
additional use of thought experiments by consequently asking: what are in this particular setting the 
access conditions, the attributes, and the audience? 
Manoeuvring through the institutional landscape 
The case starts in 1999, when a former civil servant and his American companion negotiated with the 
provincial  authorities  to  provide  a  transport  service  with  small  buses  for  elderly  and  disabled  in 
Hoogeveen. Those days multinational transport company Arriva provided regular public bus transport 
within the town, as it did in and between nearly all regions in the north. In addition, a railway operated 
by the Dutch Railways connects the town to the cities of Groningen and Zwolle. The transport system 7 
which these two entrepreneurs had in mind was supposed to serve the ‘bottom of the market’, thus 
complementing  regular  public  transport.
2  They  proposed  a  quite  innovative  service  concept  for  a 
number of reasons.
3 In proportion with the town size and target group, the buses were just large 
enough to transport eight passengers. Instead of at designated bus stops, the buses stopped for anyone 
on the route who raised his hand. It was even possible to pick up (disabled) people from their homes if 
that  would  not  disrupt  the  time  schedule.  Panels  of  users  determined  the  principle  routes,  time 
schedules, and tariffs. These features amounted to a highly flexible and demand-driven system. In 
sum: a very attractive concept for small towns. With a permit and loan from the province of Drenthe 
and subsidies from the Ministry of Traffic & Transport the two entrepreneurs set up an experiment to 
develop the system. For the exploitation of the system they founded a company called Millennium 
Transport  International  (MTI),  a  company  that  initially  employed  merely  drivers  besides  its  two 
directors. The company’s ambitious action program was to “introduce the transport concept in ten 
regions or areas in the Netherlands.”
4 The case comprises the politics involved in the realisation of part 
of this action program: providing regular public transport in and between Hoogeveen and Meppel. 
The  realisation  of  MTI’s  action  program  depended  on  its  manoeuvring  through  the  institutional 
landscape composed of a variety of political settings. The company had to encounter action programs 
of other actors participating in these settings, like authorities, other transport companies, drivers, and 
consumer  organisations.  In  the  course  of  the  project  MTI’s  action  program  was  challenged  and 
transformed in fifteen settings. Figure 2, which can be used as a map of the case, depicts these settings. 
It  will  become  clear  that  there  were  three  major  issues,  each  represented  by  one  chain  of 
displacements. Later on, these chains are followed in order to explore the effects of settings on the 
reframing of the issues. First, however, these settings are one-by-one and chronologically described in 
terms  of  their  characteristics,  their  frame,  and  their  framing  effects  on  issues  (in  terms  action 
programs).  A  chronological  order  is  preferred  to  avoid  forward-referring,  when  for  example 
developments in one chain triggered or delayed displacements in the other chain. In this article, the 
storyline is presented in the main text; the analysis is presented in the next section in table 1, but can 
be  read  in  parallel.  Each  paragraph  corresponds  to  one  column  comprising  the  characteristics  of 8 
settings, the frame of these settings, and their effects on issue framing. The reasons for displacements 
are also included in the table. 
 
<<Figure 2. Displacements between fifteen settings
5>> 
Setting 1.  Structures for negotiation (about Arriva’s tender) 
While MTI started up the experiment for elderly in Hoogeveen in 1999, provincial authorities put the 
regular  public  bus  transport  network  out  to  tender  for  the  first  time.  The  forthcoming  Passenger 
Transport Act 2000 would oblige provincial authorities to invite tenders for its public transport and 
Drenthe was one of the first to anticipate this obligation. But due to historical circumstances, this first 
invitation was only open for one provider: Arriva. The province wanted to invite together with the 
neighbouring province of Groningen and the city of Groningen in order to establish an optimally 
connected  transport  network  (Drenthe’s  own  action  program),  but  because  Groningen-city  had  a 
continuing contract with Arriva, the three authorities exclusively negotiated with this ‘monopolist’.
6 
Yet, Arriva may have been too confident about its position when it disagreed with one phrase in the 
program of requirements: “Arriva is expected to realize a substantial decrease of costs in the next four 
years.  The  savings  should  be  used  for  improvement  measures.”
7  Arriva  wanted  to  meet  all 
requirements except investing in innovation.
8 The first setting in this case comprised the structures in 
which these negotiations took place.  
Setting 2.  Provincial States (part 1) 
Facing Arriva’s standpoint Drenthe’s deputy returned to Provincial States. Within Provincial States, 
the second setting, several members recalled the small company that developed a new user driven 
transport service concept for elderly in Hoogeveen and suggested a more prominent role for MTI in 
regular public transport.
9 State members received the initiative with great enthusiasm. They did not 
think new entrants to the market should have to wait for four years, just because Arriva needed this 
time for its quality improvement. And they found that liberalization is a farce with Arriva’s exclusive 
candidacy. MTI was one of those rare transport companies willing to exploit the thin lines of transport 9 
networks: the lines that are far from profitable to operate with standard buses. State members showed 
growing appreciation for this willingness.
10 They had raised the issue whether the focus on costs 
would not go at the expense of the less profitable thin lines in rural areas and the interests of elderly 
and disabled. They considered a social system of transport more important than increased efficiency. 
Moreover, a positive evaluation report commissioned by the province recommended to scale up the 
Hoogeveen experiment in order to assess its viability.
11  
Setting 3.  Structures for negotiation (about MTI’s inclusion in Arriva’s tender) 
As a result of the discussions in Provincial States, the tender invitation could not be redone without 
somehow including MTI. The Board of Provincial Deputies decided to limit the tender period to two 
years and, more important, proposed a distinction between a ‘connecting network’ and a ‘disclosing 
network’ in order to negotiate with more parties about parts of the whole.
12 MTI could operate three 
parts: the province granted regular public transport in the towns of Hoogeveen and Meppel and in the 
so-called InterHoMe region (in between the towns) to MTI, the ‘big’ winner of these renegotiations. 
What  started  as  an  experiment  at  the  ‘bottom  of  the  market’,  quite  remote  from  the  provincial 
responsibility  for  regular  public  transport,  suddenly  became  an  ally  of  the  province  in  their 
negotiations  with  Arriva.  When  the  company  agreed  to  execute  the  three  projects  as  Arriva’s 
subcontractor, its action program (to provide regular public transport in more then one town) started to 
take off. 
Setting 4.  Development Group (part 1) 
This action program, however, was to be realized in conjunction with programs and interests of actors 
in the fourth setting: the supervising Development Group Southwest Drenthe, founded and chaired by 
the province to look after the continuation of the MTI project among other things. The group held two-
weekly  meetings.  Participants  were  representatives  of  the  province  and  the  municipalities  in  the 
region,  as  well  as  someone  from  traveller  organization  ROVER,  who  represented  a  platform  of 
consumer organizations. Furthermore, the participation of both Arriva (board and drivers) and MTI 10 
reflected constructive intentions: the group could directly allocate tasks to those actually serving the 
region.  
The most important issue the Development Group had to decide about was the concrete transport 
service plan as proposed by MTI.
13 In MTI’s philosophy users determined the routes: the proposal was 
based on public gatherings and questionnaires. Yet, MTI’s board had to compromise many  more 
desires and fit them into their cost-benefit calculations. Municipalities expressed desires about routes 
and  considerations  about  municipal  policies  (like  30  km/h  zones).
14  The  group  insisted  on  good 
connections with trains and with the Arriva lines to other parts of the province.
15 It drew attention to 
the peak loads at opening and closing hours of schools and factories, which was easily neglected in 
MTI’s user research.
16 For these peaks, MTI had to make arrangements with Arriva about back-up 
equipment  and  drivers.  In  addition,  the  two  companies  also  had  to  agree  upon  the  transition  of 
personnel and the division of earnings from the National Tariff System.
17 Although many of the costs 
and benefits were highly uncertain, MTI had to fix routes, time schedules, required equipment and 
personnel, and season-ticket tariffs before the concept could definitely be approved. The Development 
Group gave MTI the opportunity to deal with this complex situation within a relatively short period of 
time. The company presented a draft, included comments from the group, and finalized a definitive 
plan just in time.
18  
Setting 5.  Arriva’s council of employees 
The Development Group framed the transport plan from a client perspective. This, however, bypassed 
the  perspective  of  drivers:  signs  of  possible  resistance  among  drivers  were  easily  ignored  in  the 
Development Group.
19 The provincial chair said that persuasion of employees is a task for Arriva’s 
board, not for the group.
20 The group underemphasized the resistance among Arriva’s drivers and 
insufficiently realized that the council of employees had a formal mandate to disapprove the whole 
transport plan.
21  
The forthcoming Passenger Transport Act 2000 would arrange the transition of personnel if a new 
company wins a tender in order to protect drivers against unemployment. Because the law had not 
been enforced yet, the involved companies voluntarily arranged the transition. MTI hired personnel 11 
from  Arriva,  provided  that  the  former  would  apply  all  labour  conditions  as  formalized  in  the 
Collective Labour Agreement (CLA), a document negotiated between employers and labour unions.
22 
As part of the procedure Arriva’s council of employees (which consults the board of Arriva about 
decisions that possibly affect employees) had to approve the arrangement.
23  
However, the council disapproved the proposed contract, because MTI’s intentions did not match 
formal requirements.
24 MTI appeared to give a slightly different interpretation of some aspects of the 
public transport CLA: drivers did not get two breaks of 21 minutes every 4½ hour, but four times 13 
minutes in accordance with MTI’s time schedule and similar to its own employees.
25 To its own 
employees the company applied the taxi-CLA, because they drove the small 8p buses and did not have 
to  possess  a  driving  license  for  buses.  However,  Arriva’s  council  of  employees  rejected  this 
interpretation  as  far  as  the  hired  drivers  were  concerned.  This  standpoint  resulted  in  a  deadlock 
between  diverging  interests,  especially  when  MTI  stuck  with  its  own  interpretation  for  financial 
reasons and Arriva’s board took sides with its employees, because it thought MTI competed unjustly 
on labour conditions.
26 What is more, labour unions consulted by the council stated that compliance 
with the public transport CLA should not only apply to the hired drivers, but also to MTI’s own 
employees,  because  MTI  now  provided regular  public transport.
27  Labour  union  CNV  considered 
starting a legal suit.  
Setting 6.  Private meetings (province, Arriva and MTI) 
The start of the tender had meanwhile been postponed at least half a year.
28 Initially, the province had 
taken a background position and conceived of the deadlock as a conflict between two private parties. 
However, when the parties failed to agree, provincial officials intervened and succeeded to persuade 
MTI to comply with the CLA, partly because further delay would really harm the company’s financial 
situation. MTI included 21 minutes break times, but only in the schedules of those lines operated by 
Arriva employees.
29 The province decided to tolerate this situation.
30 Perhaps officials or the Deputy 
should  have  acted  more  decisive:  either  force MTI  to  comply  or  stop the  project. That  decision, 
however,  would  have  been  a  decision  for  Provincial  States  and,  more  striking,  a  shame  for  the 
initiators and for the very idea of liberalization. In the current setting, the province tried to settle the 12 
conflict  silently  by  excluding  as  many  actors  and  aspects  as  necessary.  The  boards  of  the  two 
companies indeed reached agreement, although labour unions started preparing legal procedures.
31  
Setting 7.  MTI’s office (strikes) 
When the issue displaced to the actual work floor, the detached employees themselves got involved. In 
cooperation with Arriva’s schedule makers MTI adjusted the time schedules to the 21-minutes break 
time requirement. Drivers had to be fit into the schedules in hectic circumstances.
32 The postponed 
start date neared and MTI’s schedule makers had neither experience nor proper sight on the contents 
of the public transport CLA. MTI cancelled a planned information gathering for the selected drivers 
because of time constraints. Drivers faced the outcomes of schedule making work from which they 
had been excluded, although the feasibility of these outcomes depended on their agreement. In this 
stage they raised their voice. First, with a strike they expressed dissatisfaction with ever changing 
driving  schedules  by  incompetent  schedule  makers.  Second,  with  another  strike  they  objected  to 
simplistic  revision  of  the  schedules  (lines  would  depart  and  arrive  nine  minutes  late,  causing 
passengers to complain about missed train connections). Third, over time  more and more drivers 
noticed stress and sickness. Out of twelve initially hired drivers, only two were still on the bus in the 
second year.
33  
Setting 8.  Correspondence MTI/Arriva 
Instead of giving in, MTI tried to displace the issue. In a letter to Arriva, MTI accused ‘sick’ drivers of 
work refusal, and therefore it did not want to pay the bills to Arriva. Arriva, however, ascribed the 
high  illness-rate  to  bad  management  by  MTI  and  reported  so  to  the  Development  Group.
34  The 
province’s official asked MTI and Arriva to solve the issue bilaterally, which Arriva understood as 
permission to initiate a legal procedure that should attribute responsibility on this issue.
35 This step 
made further cooperation between Arriva and MTI impossible and the province concluded that the 
only remaining solution was to discontinue the detachment arrangement. The tender ended by the end 
of the year anyway.
36 13 
Setting 9.  User panel 
User involvement was claimed to be a main feature of the MTI concept, and the concept’s appeal to 
authorities originated in part of this feature. The company announced to organize user panels to decide 
by majority about operational issues like routes, frequencies, and tariffs.
37 As soon as the Hoogeveen 
experiment had been approved, the company recruited a large number of participants for the user panel 
in canteens of old people’s homes.
38 The panel held regular meetings every month. This user panel 
would remain the only one in the case. At the time MTI had been contracted for public transport in the 
InterHoMe region, it first promised to install additional panels and later to aggregate the Hoogeveen 
panel into one panel for the whole region.
39 However, this panel never came about despite pressure 
from within the Development Group. The small MTI board prioritised solving CLA troubles over 
organizing the panel.
40 
The user panel is an exceptional setting in this case, because it remained isolated in the institutional 
landscape. Issues neither moved to nor moved from the user panel, so one would not trace this setting 
by following the issues. Yet, because its existence featured so prominently in any presentation of the 
company (in media, to authorities, in subsidy requests), it seems worthwhile to look at the discussions 
that took place within the panel.  
The Hoogeveen user panel in its early stage highly identified with the MTI management. For example, 
MTI  made  a  lot  of  announcements,  which  the  panel  hardly  disputed.
41  Applause  among  the 
participants  after  MTI  reported  about  the  hundredth  subscriber  underscored  this  ‘we’  feeling.
42 
Nevertheless,  the  user  panel  did  achieve  important  modifications  of  MTI’s  action  program.  On 
proposal of the panel MTI lengthened, shortened, diverted and combined routes; it instructed drivers to 
stop as near to the sidewalk as possible; it installed grips in the buses for better accessibility and a light 
bulb at the front window for better visibility in dark; and it provided relevant public buildings with 
time schedules.
43 
Right when the panel discovered the opportunities of participation, the director of MTI did not show 
up on a number of subsequent meetings and the panel started fearing not being taken seriously 
enough.
44 Ever more, the panel meetings showed a confrontation between the company’s perspective 14 
and the user perspective. A number of recurring issues were not settled but by overruling the panel. 
First, MTI transported a lot of employees of social workplace Alescon. This caused capacity shortage 
around 4 pm, even after MTI used a larger bus. An extra bus would have been required, but the 
company stated that it could not afford hiring an extra driver for this bus.
45 Second, MTI rejected a 
request from users to divert one route to the Carstenstraat and the cemetery. Unlike the panel, MTI 
believed that there was not enough demand at these locations.
46 Third, elderly, the original target 
group, complained about a lack of service by drivers and the company. The panel repeatedly issued the 
possibility to take walking aids on the bus. MTI’s simply advised elderly to avoid peak hours.
47 
Fourth, at the moment MTI started operating in Meppel and the InterHoMe region, it announced to 
level all tariffs. This implied a price increase of about 30% for a Hoogeveen season ticket, which 
invoked a lot of resistance in the panel. But MTI closed the discussion: “It cannot be changed 
anymore. Passengers who often make use of public transport in Hoogeveen will still profit from a 
season-ticket.”
48 To sum up, the panel indeed achieved some victories, but it lacked power to resist 
being overruled on the controversial issues; merely ‘innocent’ issues were open for discussion. 
Setting 10.  Development Group (part 2) 
Meanwhile another issue had risen in the Development Group, which would seriously threaten MTI’s 
chances in the next tender. The agenda of the group showed a number of small issues that would not 
have been mentioned here if they had not added up to a fast growing action list. MTI postponed or did 
not execute its tasks and after time the list turned into an issue itself. Most of the actions had to do 
with travel information and communication.
49 For example: 
 
•  The national internet service for travel information should get the MTI data.  
•  There should be more information along the routes.  
•  Drivers should be able to communicate in case a back-up bus meets with peak demand.  
•  It should be clear how buses deviate from the routes in case of road works.  
•  Drivers should be able to communicate with the office otherwise than by mobile phones.  15 
•  MTI should make clear how it deals with complaints.  
•  MTI should organize a user panel for the InterHoMe region.  
•  MTI should develop a communication plan.  
•  MTI should sell tickets in the bus and not let people without a pre-paid ticket travel for free.  
 
The province presented an overview to the Development Group, which summarized thirty-eight not 
(sufficiently) executed tasks from five meetings, most of them allocated to MTI. Follow-ups of these 
tasks remained unclear as the director of MTI mostly happened to be excused. He was late once, 
replaced by subordinates twice, and just absent on the last meeting.
50 The conclusion of the overview 
clearly reflected the group’s annoyance: 
 
“Unfortunately, MTI time and again shows its unprofessional side in spite of guidance by the 
province. There is a number of reasons, like a lack of experience in public transport, the small 
board of MTI, the many miscommunications within the company, and the non-attendance of 
meetings. There is a strong hierarchy at MTI, where the top decides what happens. The other 
parties in the development group unanimously find MTI unprofessional and there is explicit 
doubt whether MTI is capable of operating public transport services at all.”
51 
 
Setting 11.  Private meeting (province, MTI) 
Whereas MTI already argued with Arriva about driver sickness, it now also faced an annoyed 
Development Group. If MTI were to survive in the next tender, then it needed renewed support from 
at least the province.  
A first step towards rehabilitation was a ‘clarifying conversation’ in which the deputy of the province 
reassured the board of MTI that the company should work on the action list.
52 The province was 
authorized to commission public transport, on which MTI’s existence depended. If MTI wanted to be 
involved in the next tender, then it now had to obey the province. The province in turn wanted the 
project to become a success. The action list, an initiative of provincial officials, already reduced the 16 
variety of issues to one single issue: MTI’s capability to operate a public transport system. In the 
conversation, the two actors made arrangements about this most urgent issue without interferences and 
irritations of the other actors. As a result, the action list returned on the agenda of subsequent meetings 
and MTI reported task by task about the state of affairs. In this refreshed atmosphere the Development 
Group did not raise new issues and the most controversial ones gradually disappeared from the 
agenda.
53  
Setting 12.  Office of evaluators 
A second step towards rehabilitations of MTI and renewed support from the province was an 
evaluation of the project. Peculiarly, the evaluation did not hold MTI primarily accountable for the 
current conflicts and tensions. The province had commissioned the evaluation, but rather than 
evaluating MTI’s performance the evaluation aimed at lessons for the province regarding forthcoming 
tenders.
54 The evaluators mentioned a lot of problems, miscommunications and ignorance, but they 
only drew conclusions about how the province should have prevented or solved these problems. For 
example, they ascribed the growing action list to a lack of steering by the province: “In the 
implementation phase the province insufficiently controls the execution of arrangements between 
Arriva and MTI […] and MTI gets too much freedom in (not) living up with appointments” (p.28). It 
concluded that the project was indeed innovative and feasible and would have been better managed if 
the province had played a better part. This focus on policy lessons offered valuable input for the new 
tender invitation, but it also neutralized the annoyance and ‘excused’ MTI for its incapacity.  
Setting 13.  Provincial States (part 2)  
The provincial Board of Deputies prepared the new tender invitation and Provincial States controlled 
the Board. Thus, because the Board wanted to continue with MTI it needed to convince Provincial 
States of the capability of MTI to operate a public transport system. The Board indeed believed that 
public transport in rural areas could benefit from experiments like these.
55 The fact that the company 
was suited by labour union CNV for not complying with the CLA was countered with the argument 
that politicians should not occupy the position of judges. Waiting for a verdict the Board considered 17 
MTI innocent.
56 What is more, without much discussion it had prepared a tender invitation that clearly 
favoured MTI. The Board had invited three transport companies to compete for the contract, but the 
competitors did not have a fair chance. The program of requirements reinforced the existing situation 
(except user panel): the winner should drive the same lines with the same time schedules and kind of 
equipment as MTI had been doing for the last two years. The program even required the absence of 
regular bus stops (except for unsafe locations), which was another one of the specific features of the 
MTI concept.
57 Moreover, the contract would just last for one and half year, because Drenthe and its 
southern neighbour Overijssel had already agreed to invite tenders for an extension of the region 
around July 2005.
58 This short period was of little attraction to newcomers. While the requirements 
obviously favoured MTI, at the end of the selection procedure the company indeed appeared to have 
made the most economic tender and was selected on that ground.
59  
Setting 14.  Court 
For the new invitation MTI again prepared a tender, though without need to hire drivers this time. 
Simultaneously it developed a CLA of its own, adjusted to the flexibility of its transport concept.
60 But 
while the company indeed succeeded to win the tender,
61 its CLA would be disapproved in court. 
Labour union CNV had suited MTI in spite of the fear among a group of drivers that a verdict would 
cause MTI’s bankruptcy (the group even threatened with legal procedures against the unions). CNV 
continued nevertheless: “If MTI ceases to exist, another company will come and need drivers”.
62  
In court private interests, like the fear that a changeover from a taxi-CLA (or MTI’s own CLA) to a 
public transport CLA would cause MTI’s bankruptcy, did not count; neither did MTI’s opinion that 
the ‘entirely obsolete regulation and a very rigid CLA’ frustrate necessary innovation in public 
transport.
63 The verdict was merely based on laws. The judge concluded that the CLA carried more 
weight than MTI’s exceptional situation and obliged the company to comply with all conditions of the 
public transport CLA, meaning that it should give up developing an alternative CLA. The verdict 
included obligatory 21 minutes breaks each four and a half hour, an extra payment for weekend work, 
and days off instead of shorter workweeks.
64  18 
Setting 15.  A public debate 
Although MTI won the tender competition, it lost the legal suit. Time schedules had to be revised in 
order to integrate the 21 minutes breaks. With regard to weekend work: MTI either had to increase 
rewards or skip weekend services. Because weekend services had always been the least beneficial 
ones it chose to do the latter. But due to that decision, state subsidies also decreased.
65 For these 
reasons, MTI had cut down expenses, fired 13 out of 70 employees, and blamed the labour unions for 
that.
66  By  blaming  labour  unions,  the  director  of  MTI  tried  to  trigger  a  public  debate  about  the 
inadequacy of the current regulatory regime.  
Media are often used for lobbies towards decision-making structures. Via the media MTI succeeded to 
put its case on the agenda of another setting: the meeting between the employers’ association and 
labour unions. In this meeting CLA’s are negotiated.
67 MTI did not participate itself, but because other 
transport companies faced similar problems in consequence of the Passenger Transport Act 2000 and 
the  subsequent  changes  of  the  economic  structure  of  the  sector,  employers  and  unions  agreed  to 
modernise the CLA: “Particularly issues like flexibility, customer-orientation, and cost-control should 
be translated to organization structure, working processes, and desired culture. This raises the question 
whether  the  current  CLA  still  suit  external  developments.”
68  By  the  end  of  2003  the  parties 
commissioned a working group to advise about this issue. MTI’s case became part of the rethinking.  
Meanwhile, the company itself went bankrupt due to circumstances in another project to which it had 
extended its activities: the province of Brabant cut down subsidies because the company did not meet 
its objectives in the town of Oss and MTI could not pay the rent of buses anymore.
69 
A typology of displacements 
The case description shows that decision-making about the project occurred in many different settings 
in a complex institutional landscape. Issues were not settled until they displaced between various 
settings. This section addresses the research questions formulated earlier. First, conclusions are drawn 
about how the characteristics of settings amount to the framing of issues. Next, based on these framing 
effects, different types of displacements are discerned together with the main conditions underlying 19 
these displacements.  
The role of settings in the reframing of issues 
An  issue  can  be  defined  in  terms  of  conflicting  antiprograms  (Latour,  1991).  These  action-  and 
antiprograms are supported by actors and empowered by political means like arrangements, contracts, 
rights, knowledge, alliances, public support, etc. The assumption that settings are actively present 
involves the proposition that actors have or do not have access to these settings, that (beneficial) 
attributes are or are not available to them, and that audiences do or do not influence the course of 
action. These conditions amount to a certain framing of issues. Tables 1 characterize all settings in 
terms of the theatre stage metaphor and illustrate how they frame and reframe the issues at stake in the 
project. In the case presentation, these settings are presented chronologically. In the table, settings are 
ordered according to three main issues that can be discerned in the case: the quality/cost ratio of the 
tender, labour conditions in MTI’s plan, and service provision in practice (recall figure 2). 
 
<<Table 1. Displacements, settings, and framing of issues>> 
 
The case study shows a clear relation between the characteristics of settings and the framing of issues. 
For example, a strong attribute empowering Arriva in its negotiations with the authorities was its 
ongoing  contract  with  Groningen-city.  The  audience  of  these  negotiations  consisted  of  the 
constituencies  of  the  different  negotiators,  including  Arriva’s  shareholders.  Arriva,  aware  of  its 
privileged position, had to get a profitable deal to satisfy its shareholders. This explains why the focus 
was mainly on costs and why one paragraph in the program of requirements could cause a paralysing 
deadlock. 
Another example is Provincial States, where the issue displaced to, which framed the same issue in a 
completely  different  way.  Relevant  attributes  in  Provincial  States  were  ideologically  inspired 
arguments. Moreover, (part of) the audience expected provincial authorities to organize good public 
transport,  especially  for  those  who  depend  on  public  transport  for  their  mobility.  Due  to  these 20 
circumstances, MTI’s willingness to exploit the thin lines of the transport network became a strong 
and ultimately decisive argument in the redefinition of the mandate for negotiators. 
A third example of the impact of the characteristics of a specific setting on the framing of issues is the 
Development Group, which was a typical solution oriented stakeholder meeting due to the absence of 
a general audience. The province defined the access conditions. The setting reflected the main interest 
of the province: it was arranged to facilitate the realisation of MTI’s action program. This resulted in a 
constructive  atmosphere,  though  one  that  did  not  tolerate  conflicts  and  internal  tensions.  The 
provincial chair deliberately tried to exclude the threat of driver resistance and the issue of labour 
conditions. 
Patterns of displacements 
Based on different reframing effects, it is possible to discern five types of displacement: delegation, 
politicisation,  depoliticisation,  articulation,  and  authorisation.  In  addition,  drawing  on  the 
characterization of settings the case study learns why these five types of displacements reframe issues 
as  they  do.  Finally,  it  is possible  to  identify  the  most important  conditions and  drivers for  these 
displacements. 
 
The first type of displacement, delegation, can be defined as the attempt to realize an action program 
on the base of a broadly supported mandate. The realisation of ones action program often depends on 
cooperation  with  others.  In  order  to  align  complementary  action  programs  representatives  are 
delegated to negotiate with representatives of other stakeholders. Displacement to settings for tender 
negotiations  (see  table  1:  setting  1  and  3)  are  examples  of  delegation.  Another  example  is  the 
foundation of the Development Group to align the action programs of the province/MTI with action 
programs of the consumer organizations and municipalities involved (4). Typical for delegation is that 
participants in setting A become the audience in setting B and check whether the mandate is treated 
with care. The success of delegation relies in part on attributes that link action programs together. For 
example, the revised program of requirements was a crucial attribute leading to agreement between 
province, Arriva and MTI. With regard to the dynamics of displacement, the most important condition 21 
for delegation is a mandate enabling representatives to engage in negotiations. This mandate protects 
participants from the scorn of the audience. 
The second type of displacement, politicisation, is the discussion of the most controversial parts of an 
action program in its wider context. Due to politicisation new arguments and perspectives can enter 
the debate and surprising solutions become possible. The displacement to Provincial States to solve 
the conflict between Drenthe’s negotiator and Arriva (2) offers a telling example, because this opened 
up the possibility to include MTI based on ideologically inspired arguments. Politicisation is most 
importantly driven by explicit consultation of the audience, which in this case the shortcomings of the 
mandate begged for. 
The third type of displacement, (partial) depoliticisation, involves the bracketing and disappearance of 
antiprograms. Depoliticisation occurred when the province mediated in conflicts (6 and 11), in the 
evaluation  for  the  sake  of  policy  lessons  (12)  and  in  the  user  panel  (9).  Depoliticisation  is 
characterized by access limited to one or two actors, by an independency of participants from audience 
(if there is an audience at all), and in one instance (12) by a decisive attribute that already contained 
the conditions for depoliticisation. Depoliticisation of ‘bad management’ was completed when the 
results of two partial depoliticisations doubly bracketed the issue in a setting where participants had 
never even been fully aware of the issue (13). Depoliticisation in the user panel (9) happened because 
only one participant controlled decisive attributes, while an audience and possibilities for displacement 
(politicisation) were lacking. Depoliticisation is a strategic move of dominant actors, who are able to 
define the characteristics of a setting.  
The fourth type of displacement, articulation, is defined as the public demonstration against (part of) 
an action program. Examples of articulation are the judgment of Arriva’s council of employees (5), 
driver strikes (7), accusations between the two transport companies (8), and MTI’s protest against an 
‘obsolete CLA’ (15). In each of these examples the CLA features prominently as an empowering 
attribute, either as a ground to contest a dominant action program or as an object of contestation itself. 
Articulation is thus an effect of the recognition and use of hitherto undervalued attributes. It is a 
strategic move of dominated actors, even in the case of Arriva’s council of employees. Although 22 
displacement to this setting was already arranged in the detachment contract, the joint use of two 
attributes (the veto right and the CLA) appeared to be a very effective counterstrategy.  
The  fifth  type  of  displacement,  authorisation,  is  the  solution  for  a  conflict  on  the  base  of 
acknowledged authority. This fifth type of displacement is introduced to capture the lawsuit between 
CNV and MTI. A clear-cut conflict was settled when the judge decided about the relevance and 
applicability of predefined attributes (established laws and contracts). The audience did not matter. 
Authorisation is a strategy to strengthen action programs with formal attributes; it is made possible by 
our legal system. 
Conclusion 
The rational planning model is flawed for those who seek to align public transport provision to the 
specific demand characteristics of a certain region and who are willing to experiment with new forms 
of public transport. Likewise, the model is flawed for those who endeavour an empirically adequate 
understanding of policy making in such circumstances. Outcomes of decision-making processes hardly 
ever reflect rational intentions only. Rather than being the results of a certain transport planning and 
optimisation  logic,  these  outcomes  reflect  the  interactions,  power  disparities  and  strategic 
manoeuvring along the way. Any understanding of decision-making processes, at least in controversial 
cases, should therefore start at the local level, and only from there on try to derive at more generally 
applicable explanations.  
This study proposes an alternative approach that is much better able to accommodate the interactive, 
opportunistic  and distributed  nature  of  decision-making  about  transport issues.  What is  more, the 
results of this study go beyond demonstrating the usefulness of the approach. Based on the notions of 
issues, settings and displacements, the possibility of a new theory of decision-making about innovation 
and innovation policy is explored as this study demonstrates how opportunistic behaviour at the local 
level is patterned at the level of settings. Such patterns are understood in terms of displacements.  
The case study shows that all displacements can be characterized with a typology of five distinguished 
ways  of  reframing.  Delegation  is  the  realisation  of  an  action  program  on  the  base  of  a  broadly 23 
supported  mandate.  Articulation  is  the  public  demonstration  against  (part  of)  an  action  program. 
Politicisation  is  the  discussion  of  controversial  parts  of  an  action  program  in  its  wider  context. 
Authorisation  is  the  solution  for  a  conflict  on  the  base  of  acknowledged  authority.  And  (partial) 
depoliticisation is the bracketing and disappearance of antiprograms. These five patterns can rather 
consistently be explained by changes in the characteristics of settings in terms of access conditions, 
attributes and audience. 
The typology can be used for evaluative purposes. Elsewhere I have compared three case studies and 
derived a set of hypotheses that explain why different types of displacements provoke each other and 
how the interaction between types of displacements affects democratic quality (Nahuis, 2007). But if 
such an evaluation is to have a genuine impact on democratisation policy, then it should also be able to 
look beyond the contingencies and opportunism in the politics of innovation. By tracing the patterns 
underlying these politics, a first attempt towards a more general theory of displacements is made.  
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<< Figure 1. The conceptual framework>>   
  
 
<<Figure 2. Displacements between fifteen settings>>   
 <<Table 1. Displacements, settings, and framing of issues>> 
 
Issue 1: mismatches between the requirements to and the quality level of the service 
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Distrust is bracketed and MTI 
excused for bad management 
particularly due to one crucial 
attribute: instruction to focus on 
policy lessons 









Access: Elected State 
members 
 
Attributes: Outcomes of 11 
and 12 
 
Audience: Electorate not 
very interested 
Attributes support perception of 
MTI project as interesting 
innovation (bad management is 
no issue) 
MTI is invited to offer + 
biased program of 
requirements … 
 
… “MTI is not guilty until 
there is a verdict” + very 
economic offer … 
 
… MTI selected 




… Two other offers + 
companies not really 
interested … 
 
- <<Table 1. Displacements, settings, and framing of issues>> 
 
Issue 2: The conflict about the Collective Labour Agreement (CLA) 













knowledge about demand 
 
Audience: (constituencies at 
a considerable distance) 
Strong focus on service 
characteristics; driver resistance 
no issue 
MTI proposal  + 
knowledge derived from 




… Same + adjustments 
based on 
recommendations 
 …. Recommendations 








was to be 
consulted as 










Access: Elected employees, 
some member of labor 
union 
 
Attributes: Veto right, public 





Group is also interested 
MTI project and time schedules 
reframed as breach of CLA. 
Disapproval reflects scepticism of 
main audience 
(Adjusted) transport plan 
as agreed by the 
Development Group … 
… Council’s disapproval + 
resistance among Arriva 
drivers + veto + support 
from labour unions + 
support from Arriva’s 
board 
The province 
tries to hush up 







Access: Provincial officials 
approached directors of MTI 
and Arriva 
 
Attributes: Arguments about 
the costs of delay, 
reputations were put at 
stake 
 
No audience present, 
behind the scenes 
By bracketing antiprograms of 
employees (via limitations to 
access and exclusion of audience) 
persuasion of Arriva’s board 
sufficed to remove the CLA 
conflict from the centre of the 
stage 
Proposal as agreed in 
Development Group + 
provincial toleration + 
Arriva’s board gives up 
protest … 
… (Angry council of 
employees + angry labour 












Access: Drivers who 
question work of schedule 
makers 
 
Attributes: CLA, shared 
dissatisfaction, support from 
labor unions 
 
Audience: Boards of MTI 
and Arriva 
CLA conflict could return at the 
centre of the stage, now as 
sickness generator, because 




… Revised schedules … 
… Driver dissatisfaction + 
strike … 
 
… Still dissatisfaction + 
another strike + epidemic 
sickness … <<Table 1. Displacements, settings, and framing of issues>> 
 
Displacement  Setting  Characteristics  Issue framing  Action program  Antiprogram 
Unpaid bills for 
sick drivers is 
problem for 





Access: MTI and Arriva 
accuse each other 
 
Attributes: Sick drivers, 




Group, not very interested 
Interpretation of driver sickness 
and ascription of costs again 
divided MTI and Arriva  
… Sick drivers + “work 
refusal” + breach of 
detachment contract … 
… Sick drivers + “bad 
management” + unpaid 
bills + labour unions + 
CLA 
Labour union 
CNV started a 
legal suit, 
because MTI 
would not apply 
public transport 




Access: Labour union CNV 
suits MTI, judge 
 
Attributes: MTI’s exceptional 
situation versus general 





Court reduced the entire MTI 
project to one aspect: labour 
conditions. Attributes relating to 
other aspects were not relevant in 
this setting 
Flexible application of CLA 
+ “exceptional situation” … 
 … MTI should fully 
comply with public 
transport CLA … 
MTI started a 
public debate 
about the 










case, links with societal 
trends 
 
Audience: Everybody in 
principle, CLA negotiators in 
particular 
Access conditions and attributes 
enabled MTI to frame the CLA as 
an innovation barrier instead of 
labour protection 
… CLA + “rigidity and 
obsolesce” + MTI’s 
innovative concept + 
verdict + collective 
dismissal 
- <<Table 1. Displacements, settings, and framing of issues>> 
 
Issue 3: Tensions on the level of the practicalities of the service 
Displacement  Setting  Characteristics  Issue framing  Action program  Antiprogram 
User panel was 




User panel  Access: MTI management 
and recruited season-ticket 
holders 
 
Attributes: Information from 
MTI management, own 
experience. Financial 
responsibility and decision-
making authority remained 
at MTI board 
 
No audience present. DG 
treated decisions as if they 
were MTI’s 
Due to the absence of an 
audience, the interests of the 
participants determined the 
framing of issues in terms of 
service characteristics.  
In conflicts MTI was clearly better 
empowered: it possessed the 
decisive attributes and the 
audience-at-a-distance was 
particularly watching MTI’s 
performance 
“Routes do not meet 
demand optimally”  + 
demand estimations + 
own experience … 
 
“Elderly have difficulty to 
enter buses” + examples + 
suggestions … 
 
“Buses hardly visible in 
dark” + suggestions … 
 
“Lack of information” + 
suggestions … 
 
“Capacity shortage at 
4pm” + Alescon transport 
+ passengers refused … 
 
Request to include 
Carstenstraat and 
cemetery + demand 
estimation based on  own 
experience … 
 
Elderly want to take 
walking aids on board … 
 
30% tariff increase is too 
much … 





... buses stop near 
sidewalk + grips installed 
 
 
... light bulbs installed 
 
 
… public buildings 
provided with schedules 
 
… “Cannot afford extra 
bus and driver” 
 
 






… MTI advises elderly to 
avoid peak hours 
 
… “It cannot be changed 
anymore” 
 
 